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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of the appropriate balance between security and 
individual rights—an intractable problem in any society committed to 
both—lies at the heart of the upcoming Supreme Court case Florence 
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders.1 In Florence, the Court will address a 
specific iteration of this perennial issue: whether the Fourth 
Amendment2 permits jail policies mandating strip searches of every 
person arrested, even when the offense is trivial and there is no 
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is attempting to smuggle 
weapons, drugs, or other contraband.3 
The Court addressed a similar issue once before. In its five-to-four 
1979 decision Bell v. Wolfish,4 the Court created and applied a four-
factor balancing test for evaluating the constitutionality of physically 
 
* 2013 JD/MA candidate, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful for the efforts of 
Hannah Banks, whose industry, insight, and eye for detail made this commentary possible. 
 1.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2011). 
 2.  The Fourth Amendment, incorporated and made applicable against the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 3.  Brief for Petitioner at i, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed 
June 20, 2011). “Reasonable suspicion” is a very low standard. As the Court has noted, 
“reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing 
considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, [it] requires at least a minimal level of 
objective justification. . . . [An] officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–
24 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 4.  441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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intrusive searches conducted within detention facilities.5 The Court 
divided closely,6 but ultimately upheld a policy requiring that all 
inmates submit to a visual body-cavity search after each contact visit 
with someone from outside the facility.7 
Despite previous agreement on the proper interpretation of Bell, a 
circuit split has recently developed, with each side emphasizing 
different aspects of the decision. Because each side can fairly claim 
consistency with Bell, the Court’s decision in Florence is difficult to 
predict and may ultimately depend on the Court’s value judgment as 
to whether security should trump individual rights in this particular 
context. Adding further uncertainty is a separate precedent, Turner v. 
Safley,8 which may have subsumed Bell and provides a more 
deferential and generally applicable standard for evaluating detention 
regulations.9 If Bell is applied, blanket policies mandating strip 
searches of all arrestees likely will be upheld by a closely divided 
Court. However, if the Court decides that Turner supplies the proper 
standard, the Court probably will remand to the Third Circuit with 
instructions to apply Turner’s reasonable-relationship test. 
II. FACTS 
On March 3, 2005, Albert Florence was pulled over by a state 
trooper in Burlington County, New Jersey.10 After asking for 
identification, the trooper arrested Florence pursuant to a bench 
warrant issued in 2003 for his failure to pay a fine.11 Although 
Florence’s wife provided the arresting officer with official 
documentation showing that the ticket had already been paid, the 
 
 5.  Id. at 559–60.  
 6.  The Court was divided five-to-four on the issue of strip searches only. Regarding the 
panoply of other issues it considered, the Court’s vote was six-to-three. See id. at 522. 
 7.  Id. at 559–60. Some courts and policies employ terminology that differentiates between 
“strip searches” and “visual body-cavity searches,” although others do not. Compare Bull v. City 
& Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 969 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing a policy stating 
that “[s]trip searches include a visual body cavity search. A strip search does not include a 
physical body cavity search”), and Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(“A ‘strip search’ involves a visual inspection of the naked body of an inmate. A ‘visual body 
cavity search’ is a strip search that includes the visual examination of the anal and genital 
areas.”), with Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393 n.1 (10th Cir. 1984) (defining “strip search” as 
“having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a 
visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, or female breasts of such person”). 
 8.  482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 9.  Id. at 81. 
 10.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496 (D.N.J. 2009), rev’d, 
621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 11.  Id. 
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county had failed to update its computer system and the officer 
continued with the arrest.12 
After arresting Florence on the defunct warrant, the officer 
brought him to the Burlington Jail.13 There, Florence was directed, in 
line with a policy applicable to all arrestees, to undress completely, 
hold his arms out, and turn fully around while an officer sat within 
arm’s length.14 Florence was also told, possibly in violation of the jail’s 
own policy,15 to “open his mouth, lift his tongue . . . and lift his 
genitals.”16 He was then directed to shower.17 
After six days of imprisonment in Burlington, Florence was 
transported to the Essex Jail.18 There, pursuant to a similar policy,19 
Florence was strip searched a second time.20 Officers directed him and 
several others to strip and shower while two officers watched; he was 
then told to open his mouth and lift his genitals, turn away, squat and 
cough, then turn back around.21 The next day, the charges against 
Albert Florence were dismissed.22 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Since deciding Bell v. Wolfish in 1979, the Court has considered 
other cases involving intrusive searches23 and has repeatedly 
recognized the importance of prison security.24 However, Bell remains 
 
 12.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 3.  
 13.  Florence, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496.  
 14.  Id. at 496–97.  
 15.  The policy of the Burlington Jail differentiated between “visual observation” and 
“strip searches.” The former involved having the inmates undress so that an officer could check 
them for scars, marks, and tattoos. Id. at 498. The latter also included telling the inmates to 
“spread their buttocks and/or lift their genitals.” Id. According to the Burlington Jail’s internal 
policies, detainees like Florence, who did not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion, were 
supposed to be subjected to “visual observation” but not to “strip searches.” Id. at 497.  
 16.  Id. at 496–97. 
 17.  Id. at 497. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  In contrast to the policy at Burlington, the policy in force at the Essex Jail required all 
arrestees to submit to a strip search, and did not differentiate between “strip searches” and 
“visual observation.” Id. at 499. 
 20.  Id. at 497. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  E.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (2009) (holding 
unconstitutional a strip search of a teenage girl); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 
U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (upholding the detention and manual body-cavity search of a woman 
suspected of smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal). 
 24.  E.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“[P]rison security is a 
compelling state interest . . . .”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
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the only case in which the Court has addressed blanket policies 
mandating strip searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees.25 
Accordingly, it likely will be central to the Court’s decision in 
Florence. 
In the alternative, the Supreme Court may instead apply the 
highly deferential standard from Turner v. Safley.26 Turner’s 
reasonable-relationship test is limited “only to rights that are 
‘inconsistent with proper incarceration’”27 and the Court has not 
directly applied Turner to Fourth Amendment rights within a prison 
or jail.28 Still, the Court has held that Fourth Amendment rights are 
severely limited within detention facilities29 and could establish 
Turner’s standard as the proper test for Fourth Amendment violations 
in such locations. 
A. The Key Precedent: Bell v. Wolfish 
The most important precedent for the resolution of Florence is the 
Supreme Court decision authored by Justice Rehnquist in Bell v. 
Wolfish. In that case, the Supreme Court considered challenges to 
several practices at a federal custodial facility in New York City.30 The 
facility primarily held pretrial detainees, but also housed smaller 
numbers of convicted inmates serving short sentences, people charged 
with contempt, and witnesses held in protective custody.31 One 
challenged policy mandated that every inmate submit to a strip and 
visual body-cavity search after every contact visit with a person from 
outside the facility.32 This policy applied to all inmates, regardless of 
the reason for their incarceration, and did not require any level of 
suspicion that they possessed contraband.33 
 
U.S. 517, 526 (1984).  
 25.  Daphne Ha, Blanket Policies for Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees: An 
Interdisciplinary Argument for Reasonableness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2731 (2011).  
 26.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  
 27.  Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 
126, 131 (2003)).  
 28.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 306 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 29.  E.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (holding that there is no Fourth 
Amendment protection for a prisoner’s cell because such protection “cannot be reconciled with 
the . . . needs and objectives of penal institutions”). 
 30.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979). 
 31.  Id. at 523–24. 
 32.  Id. at 558. The Court described the visual body-cavity search as follows: “If the inmate 
is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection. The 
vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates also are visually inspected.” Id. at 558 n.39. 
 33.  Id. at 558. 
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The Court noted that both convicted prisoners and pretrial 
detainees retain some constitutional protections.34 The Court also 
recognized, however, that these retained rights can be limited or 
retracted in the interest of internal discipline.35 Given the importance 
of this interest, “[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-
ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and 
practices . . . needed to . . . maintain institutional security.”36 
Against this deferential backdrop, the Court assumed (without 
deciding) that both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain 
some Fourth Amendment rights, but noted that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits only searches that are unreasonable under the 
circumstances.37 What is reasonable “is not capable of precise 
definition or mechanical application,” and requires “a balancing of the 
need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights 
that the search entails.”38 Regarding a strip search in a detention 
facility, courts must consider four factors: “[T]he scope of the 
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”39 
Applying this four-factor balancing test, the Court combined 
consideration of the place and justification factors and opined that 
“[a] detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security 
dangers.”40 Even though body-cavity searches revealed hidden 
contraband only once during the jail’s short history, the Court read 
the absence of a record as “a testament to the effectiveness of this 
search technique as a deterrent.”41 Such disregard for a requirement 
of a factual record implies that security against contraband is so 
central to jail and prison administration that the need for specific 
measures need not actually be proven. 
In contrast to its analysis of the location and jail’s security 
concerns, the Court spent very little time on the manner of the search 
or the individual interests at stake, offering briefly that it did “not 
 
 34.  Id. at 545.  
 35.  Id. at 546. The Court later clearly held that “prison security is a compelling state 
interest.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005). 
 36.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (stating that 
security decisions are “peculiarly within the province . . . of corrections officials, and . . . courts 
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment”).  
 37.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 558. 
 38.  Id. at 559.  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
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underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the 
personal privacy of inmates” and that “conduct[ing] the search in an 
abusive fashion . . . cannot be condoned.”42 But ultimately, to the 
question of whether visual body-cavity searches can “ever be 
conducted on less than probable cause,”43 the Court answered yes. 
B. Circuit Split on the Meaning of Bell 
The federal circuit courts were in accord as recently as 2007 
regarding the unconstitutionality of policies requiring strip searches 
(or other similarly intrusive searches) of all detainees, regardless of 
reasonable suspicion.44 Since then, however, two circuits have reversed 
course and upheld such policies. In Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders,45 the Third Circuit joined them.46 
1. Circuit Decisions Striking Down Blanket Strip-Search Policies 
The circuit courts applying the Bell four-factor balancing test to 
strike down blanket strip-search policies generally have emphasized 
the intrusiveness of the search, downplayed security concerns 
(especially as compared to those in Bell), and noted that less 
restrictive alternatives would serve the same goals just as well. First, 
the First Circuit described a strip search as “an extreme intrusion on 
personal privacy and an offense to the dignity of the individual.”47 
 
 42.  Id. at 560.  
 43.  Id. Notably, this language leaves in serious doubt just what “less than probable cause” 
means, and thus what the Fourth Amendment requires before a strip search of a pretrial 
detainee is permissible. Justice Powell wrote a brief separate opinion bearing on this issue, the 
entirety of which reads:  
I join the opinion of the Court except the discussion and holding with respect to body-cavity 
searches. In view of the serious intrusion on one’s privacy occasioned by such a search, I think at 
least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal 
and genital searches described in this case. I therefore dissent on this issue.  
Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, this opinion has not 
been dispositive of Bell’s meaning for lower courts. 
 44.  See Katherine A. James, Standard Operating Procedure: Take It All Off [N.G. Ex Rel. 
S.C. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004)], 44 WASHBURN L.J. 665, 675 (2005). 
 45.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 46.  Compare id. at 311 (upholding strip searches without reasonable suspicion), Bull v. 
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same), and Powell v. 
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (same), with Roberts v. Rhode Island, 
239 F.3d 107, 108 (1st Cir. 2001) (requiring reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search), 
Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (same), Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 798 
(2d Cir. 1986) (same), Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1985) (same), Stewart v. 
Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1985) (same), Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394–
95 (10th Cir. 1984) (same), Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(same), Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (same). 
 47.  Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Other courts have 
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Second, the court opined that new arrestees are less likely to smuggle 
contraband than detainees leaving a contact visit because arrests, 
unlike contact visits, are generally unplanned.48 Third, given the 
paucity of instances in which a body-cavity search was necessary to 
discover contraband, less extreme measures—such as only searching 
the clothes of petty offenders or requiring reasonable suspicion—
would have been equally effective.49 In sum, the intrusiveness of the 
search, the lower security risks involved, and the availability of 
alternatives rendered the policy unconstitutional.50 
2. Circuit Decisions Upholding Blanket Strip-Search Policies 
On the other side of the split, the three Circuits that applied Bell’s 
four-factor test to uphold blanket strip-search policies have 
emphasized security concerns, deference toward prison officials, the 
minimal factual record of smuggling in Bell, and the similarly or less 
intrusive nature of the searches as compared to those in Bell. First, the 
Eleventh Circuit, for example, reiterated the dangers of smuggling 
and added the further security concern of identifying gang members 
who “are often more violent, dangerous, and manipulative than other 
inmates, regardless of the charges against them.”51 The court rejected 
the argument that arrest usually comes as a surprise as “factual[ly] . . . 
unsupportable” because some members see arrest coming, others turn 
themselves in, and others (especially gang members) deliberately get 
themselves arrested.52 Second, the court noted that the policy upheld 
in Bell was extraordinarily broad: despite the minimal factual record 
of smuggling, it required no level of suspicion and did not 
differentiate between convicted felons, suspected misdemeanants, and 
the unaccused.53 Finally, the searches at issue were less intrusive than 
those in Bell.54 In short, because the balance between privacy and 
security so closely resembled that in Bell, the policy was 
 
used even stronger language. E.g., Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(describing a strip search as “an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude”). 
 48.  Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111; see also Howard Friedman, Strip Searches and the Fourth 
Amendment Rights of Detainees and Prisoners, 2004 WL 2800491, at *8 (2009) (“Policies 
involving routine strip searches upon admission of people who have just been arrested and are 
waiting for bail to be set or for a first court appearance have been held unconstitutional, in part 
because such individuals do not typically plan to be arrested.”). 
 49.  Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112. 
 50.  Id. at 111–13. 
 51.  Powell, 541 F.3d at 1311 (internal quotations omitted).  
 52.  Id. at 1313. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 1314. 
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constitutional.55 
C. A Possible Alternative: The Reasonable-Relationship Test of Turner 
v. Safley 
In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court articulated a highly 
deferential and more generally applicable standard for evaluating the 
constitutionality of policies that impinge upon the retained 
constitutional rights of prisoners.56 In striking down a provision that 
limited inmates’ ability to get married and upholding a provision 
restricting correspondence between inmates, the Court held that 
“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, 
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”57 
This reasonable-relationship test considers four factors. First, 
there must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and 
a legitimate, neutral government interest.58 Second, courts should 
consider whether there remain alternative means of exercising the 
asserted right.59 Third, courts should take into account the impact of 
accommodating the right, particularly on guards, other inmates, and 
the allocation of detention resources.60 Fourth, the absence of feasible 
alternatives that present only a de minimis cost to prisons can indicate 
unreasonableness, but there is no requirement that a regulation be the 
least-restrictive alternative.61 
The Turner standard is more deferential than the standard in 
Bell.62 Although it applies “only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with 
proper incarceration,’”63 it has been construed broadly to include 
claims regarding freedom of association, inmate correspondence, 
receipt of publications, attendance at religious services, and the right 
 
 55.  Id. at 1302. Accord Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
 56.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987). 
 57.  Id. at 89. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 90. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 90–91. 
 62.  E.g., Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“Because we 
conclude that plaintiffs lose even under the . . . approach of Bell, we need not decide if that 
approach has been superseded by the more deferential Turner one.”). 
 63.  Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 
126, 131 (2003)).  
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not to be forcibly medicated.64 The Supreme Court has upheld 
limitations on Fourth Amendment rights in detention facilities in a 
number of cases,65 but “has [never directly] applied the reasonable-
relationship test of Turner to a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
prison policies.”66 In addition, it is unclear whether Turner even 
applies to jails or is limited only to prisons.67 Nonetheless, the Court 
could extend the Turner standard to the Fourth Amendment issues in 
Florence.68 
IV. HOLDING 
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Third Circuit 
reversed the district court and held that a blanket policy of strip 
searching all arrestees, regardless of their suspected offense and in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion, is constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish.69 
The Third Circuit began by laying out its task: “[T]o determine 
which line of cases [in the circuit split] is more faithful to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bell.”70 The court applied the four-factor test from 
Bell to balance government interests in security against the personal 
rights of inmates.71 Regarding invasiveness, the court found that “the 
searches at issue [were] less intrusive than the visual body-cavity 
searches” in Bell.72 It likewise concluded that the manner and place 
prongs were satisfied because of the similarities with Bell.73 
 
 64.  Id. at 510; see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006) (applying Turner to 
uphold the denial of newspapers, magazines, and photographs to dangerous inmates); Lewis v. 
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361–62 (1996) (applying Turner to strike down a court’s requirement of 
sweeping changes to a prison’s library and legal systems).  
 65.  E.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (finding no Fourth Amendment 
protection within prison cells). 
 66.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 306 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). However, 
in Washington v. Harper, the Court applied the Turner standard to a due process challenge to 
uphold a prison policy that impinged upon bodily autonomy by allowing the forced medication 
of seriously mentally ill inmates. 494 U.S. 210, 224–25 (1990). 
 67.  Compare Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (limiting the application of 
Turner to prisons), with Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2007) (opining 
that Turner does apply to jails).  
 68.  See Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(“Although Bell continues to provide definitive guidance for analyzing detention-facility strip 
searches under the Fourth Amendment, Turner v. Safley is also relevant to our analysis.”). 
 69.  Florence, 621 F.3d at 311. 
 70.  Id. at 299. 
 71.  Id. at 301. 
 72.  Id. at 307. 
 73.  Id. at 308. 
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The Third Circuit devoted much of its analysis to the justifications 
for the search, determining that “the security interest in preventing 
smuggling at the time of intake is as strong as the interest in 
preventing smuggling after . . . contact visits.”74 As in Bell, the low risk 
and minimal record of smuggling were insufficient to require the jails 
to differentiate between different types of inmates or to articulate 
individualized suspicion to justify a strip search.75 Critically, the Third 
Circuit rejected the argument that the security risk was lower than in 
Bell because arrests for trivial offenses are usually by surprise.76 Even 
if such arrests are usually unexpected, sometimes they are not, and 
people arrested for serious crimes could coerce or cajole those 
accused of minor crimes to smuggle weapons or contraband for 
them.77 
Ultimately, because of the policies’ similarity to the one upheld in 
Bell, the Third Circuit concluded that the facilities’ security interests 
outweighed the deprivations of inmate privacy, and held the policies 
of Burlington and Essex Counties constitutional.78 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner Florence’s Arguments 
Petitioner Florence’s overarching argument is that the Bell 
balancing test requires reasonable suspicion before conducting a strip 
search of a minor offender.79 In general, this five-point argument is 
heavy on anecdotal evidence of the harms of strip searches and 
empirical evidence of the feasibility of alternatives, but lighter on 
relevant Supreme Court precedent. 
First, Florence argues that a practical consensus developed in the 
wake of Bell, asserting that strip searches of minor offenders are 
unreasonable without individualized suspicion. Until recently, this 
 
 74.  Id. at 307. The court also considered two further interests advanced by the 
government: identification of gang members by observing their tattoos, and preventing the 
spread of contagious diseases. Id. 
 75.  Id. at 308–09. 
 76.  Id. at 308. 
 77.  Id. The Supreme Court has found such reasoning persuasive at least once before. In 
upholding an across-the-board ban on contact visits in a jail, the Court opined that “[i]t is not 
unreasonable to assume, for instance, that low security risk detainees would be enlisted to help 
obtain contraband or weapons by their fellow inmates who are denied contact visits.” Block v. 
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984). 
 78.  Florence, 621 F.3d at 311. 
 79.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 3. 
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consensus included every circuit to consider the issue, “every relevant 
division of the U.S. Department of Justice,” including the Bureau of 
Prisons, several other government offices, and eighteen states.80 
Second, Florence also presses that strip searches are an extreme 
invasion of personal dignity, especially for sensitive populations like 
victims of sexual assault, first-time offenders, members of religious 
communities that emphasize modesty, and women who are 
menstruating or lactating.81 Blanket policies preclude the discretion 
necessary to accommodate these groups. 
Third, Florence offers several stark examples to show that blanket 
strip-search policies have “sweeping implications” given the “number 
of trivial offenses for which individuals are regularly arrested.”82 For 
example, the Essex and Burlington Jails alone had strip searched 
individuals charged only with car equipment violations, failure to use 
a turn signal, or riding a bicycle without an audible bell.83 These 
examples illustrate the disproportionate treatment blanket policies 
permit, especially in the case of arrests by overzealous officers. 
Fourth, Florence concedes that smuggling is a problem, but argues 
that a standard of individual suspicion, coupled with other less 
intrusive detection measures, would just as effectively safeguard 
security interests. Florence offers the findings of a federal court, which 
reviewed 23,000 suspicionless strip searches of arrestees during a four-
year period and concluded that “there was at most one instance in 
which a person smuggling drugs—and none carrying weapons—might 
have evaded detection under a reasonable suspicion regime.”84 
 
 80.  Id. at 13–17. 
 81.  Id. at 23–25. For example, one Chicago physician subjected to a strip search became 
paranoid and depressed, suffered suicidal feelings, and could no longer disrobe anywhere but in 
a closet. Id. at 23. A rape victim called her mother after a strip search and told her repeatedly 
“they’ve done it again, they’ve done it again.” Id. at 24 (internal alterations omitted). And a 
Colorado woman strip searched after a wrongful arrest began lactating, was ordered not to 
cover herself with her arms, and had to use a maxi pad to absorb her breast milk. Id. at 24 
(citing Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
 82.  Id. at 24–25. Importantly, the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of 
arrests for very minor offenses that do not include the threat of incarceration. Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). 
 83.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 25. Florence’s parade of horrible continues with 
examples from other districts, such as a woman in Washington, D.C., arrested and strip searched 
for eating a sandwich on the Metro, another woman in D.C. arrested for “false pretenses” after 
entering a parking garage and immediately leaving because the cost was too high, and a nun 
arrested for trespassing at an anti-war protest. Id. at 25–26.  
 84.  Id. at 29–30.  
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Because arrests for minor offenses are almost always unexpected,85 it 
is hardly surprising that “there is not a single documented example of 
anyone concealing contraband during arrest for a minor offense with 
the intent of smuggling contraband into the jail.”86 
Fifth, Florence argues that other alternatives would serve jails’ 
security interests just as effectively. Upon arrival, jail officials could 
search detainees’ clothing and personal property, pat them down, 
visually examine them in their underwear, and put them through 
metal detectors; individualized suspicion could then justify more 
intrusive measures.87 Such suspicion could be based on the nature of 
the offense, the circumstances of arrest, or the arrestee’s prior 
history.88 
In short, the problems that the blanket policy addresses, but 
reasonable suspicion would not, are at best overstated and at worst 
nonexistent. For these reasons, Petitioner Florence insists that the 
Court should strike down such blanket strip-search policies. 
B. The Respondent Jails’ Arguments 
The Respondent Jails offer three reasons why the Court should 
affirm the Third Circuit and uphold policies requiring strip searches of 
all arrestees. First, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to intake searches of arrestees,89 
or applies in only a minimal way.90 Whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies to a particular expectation of privacy hinges on whether 
“society is prepared to recognize [that expectation] as reasonable,”91 
and recent cases have opined that “a right of privacy . . . is 
fundamentally incompatible with the close and continued surveillance 
of inmates and their cells.”92 Thus, because it cannot comport with 
security interests, no right to privacy exists within detention facilities.93 
 
 85.  Id. at 38 (contrasting the planned visits in Bell with unplanned arrests).  
 86.  Id. at 29 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
 87.  Id. at 31–32.  
 88.  Id. at 32–33.  
 89.  Brief for Respondents Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility & Essex Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t at 3, 
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed Aug. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Brief 
for Essex]. 
 90.  Brief for Respondents Bd. of Chosen Freeholders et. al at 20, Florence v. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed Aug. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Brief for Burlington]. 
 91.  Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 16 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 
(1984) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 92.  Id. at 19 (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527–28).  
 93.  Id. at 21. 
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The Jails backed off this claim during oral arguments, however, by 
conceding that there should be some level of suspicion to justify a 
manual body-cavity search.94 This concession implies that inmates 
retain minimal privacy interests, rather than no privacy interests. 
Second, if inmates retain any privacy rights, then the reasonable-
relationship test of Turner v. Safley should apply, which the policies at 
issue easily satisfy.95 Turner applies whenever a detention policy 
implicates a constitutional right that is inconsistent with proper 
incarceration, and privacy under the Fourth Amendment falls 
squarely within that category.96 Turner’s highly deferential test 
requires only that the policy be “reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”97 The burden is on the prisoner to prove 
unreasonableness, and given the deference due to detention officials, 
that burden is not easily satisfied.98 Respondents argue that “there is 
an unquestionably valid, rational connection between the searches 
and security.”99 Furthermore, there is no reason to differentiate 
between minor and serious offenders; if such a distinction were 
recognized, those charged with serious crimes might coerce minor 
offenders into secreting contraband for them.100 Because there is no 
way to accommodate the individual’s privacy interest without 
sacrificing security or imposing substantial costs on the detention 
facility, Respondents argue, the policies should be upheld under 
Turner.101 
Third, an analysis under the balancing test of Bell v. Wolfish yields 
the same result.102 Bell, they argue, created a “special needs” 
exception, applicable here, which eliminates the normal requirement 
for either reasonable suspicion or probable cause before searching an 
individual.103 Moreover, each of the factors considered in Bell104—the 
 
 94.  Transcript of Oral Arguments at 40–41, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 
10-945 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Transcript], available at http://www. 
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-945.pdf. 
 95.  Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 25; see also Brief for Burlington, supra note 90, at 26. 
 96.  Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 26–27. 
 97.  Brief for Burlington, supra note 90, at 26 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987)); see also id. at 25 (contrasting “reasonably related” with “arbitrary or purposeless”).  
 98.  Id. at 27 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“The burden . . . is not 
on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.”)). 
 99.  Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 30.  
 100.  Id. at 34–35. 
 101.  Id. at 37–39. 
 102.  Id. at 39. 
 103.  Id. at 39–41. 
 104.  See supra Part III.A. 
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scope of the intrusion and the manner, place, and justifications of the 
search—weigh at least as heavily in Florence as they did in Bell.105 
Further, in addition to smuggling concerns, the Jails add the interest of 
identifying gang members106 and preventing the spread of lice and 
communicable disease.107 
In brief, the Jails argue that the reduced privacy interests in 
detention facilities, the compelling interest in security, and the 
similarities between the circumstances of Florence and Bell require 
that the policies be affirmed as constitutional. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The circuits requiring reasonable suspicion before strip-searching 
minor offenders have been faithful to Bell insofar as they have 
applied its balancing test fairly and produced outcomes that are 
consistent with the specific language of its holding.108 The Third 
Circuit, however, employed the stronger interpretation of Bell—it 
looked at not only what the Court said but what it did.109 The policy 
upheld in Bell was extraordinarily broad: it did not differentiate 
between categories of inmates, but required strip searches of 
suspected felons, misdemeanants, and the unaccused alike. Moreover, 
it required only the flimsiest factual record of a smuggling problem 
that only strip searches could address. And perhaps most importantly, 
as Justice Powell’s separate opinion made clear, the Bell majority 
expounded no limiting requirement of reasonable suspicion.110 
Here, there are only two material differences between the facts of 
Bell and the facts of Florence. First, the policies involved in Florence 
are, if anything, less intrusive than the one at issue in Bell. The policies 
in Florence always require strip searches, and only sometimes require 
 
 105.  Brief for Essex, supra note 89, at 41–44.  
 106.  Id. at 28, 34. 
 107.  Brief for Burlington, supra note 90, at 41. 
 108.  E.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[In Bell,] the Court 
found that visual body cavity searches . . . can be conducted on less than probable cause. . . . 
This Court held [later] that, at least in the context of prisoners held for minor offenses, the Bell 
balance requires officers to have a reasonable suspicion that a particular detainee harbors 
contraband prior to conducting a strip or visual body cavity search.” (internal citations and 
quotations omitted)).  
 109.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 110.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 563 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“In view of the serious intrusion on one’s privacy occasioned by such a search, I think 
at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to justify the anal 
and genital searches described in this case. I therefore dissent on this issue.”).  
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visual body-cavity searches.111 In contrast, Bell mandated visual body-
cavity searches for everyone after a contact visit.112 This difference 
weighs in favor of finding the searches constitutional. 
The second difference—the strength of the security interest—cuts 
the other way. As many of the circuit courts have emphasized, arrests 
for trivial offenses, such as traffic violations and failure to pay fines, 
are usually unexpected; therefore, the risk of planned smuggling is 
minimal.113 The problem with relying on this difference to justify a 
divergent outcome is that Bell did not require a record.114 Rather, the 
Court’s deference was so extreme that “security” became almost a 
magic word, erasing any requirement that even demeaning practices 
be justified by a showing of necessity. As a result, the differences 
surrounding the strip searches are probably too slender a reed to 
distinguish Bell. 
In short, there is no major problem with the Third Circuit’s 
reading of Bell—the problem is with Bell itself. For at least three 
reasons, the Court should reconsider this decision or limit its reach. 
First, Bell dramatically undervalues the invasive nature of strip 
searches.115 The Seventh Circuit has appropriately described them “as 
demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, 
unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, [and] signifying degradation and 
submission,”116 and commentators have noted that strip searches 
would be considered sexual assault in any other context.117 Moreover, 
the Court has repeatedly recognized strong, constitutionally 
significant interests in bodily integrity. For example, in medical 
decision-making and reproductive rights cases,118 this interest has been 
described as nearly inviolate and founded on basic human dignity. 
Why such logic loses its force at the prison gate is a mystery. 
 
 111.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497–99 (D.N.J. 2009), 
rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 112.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 558. 
 113.  Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111; see also Friedman, supra note 48, at *8. 
 114.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 
 115.  See generally Brief for Psychiatrists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Florence 
v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. filed June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Brief for 
Psychiatrists]. 
 116.  Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 117.  See Ha, supra note 25, at 2742; see also supra Part V.A. 
 118.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (referring to “the 
urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, [which 
is] implicit in the meaning of liberty”). 
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Second, reasonable suspicion is so low a standard that it is difficult 
to imagine that its application could noticeably hinder security efforts. 
Reasonable suspicion requires only “a minimum level of justification” 
and that an officer “be able to articulate more than an inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch” that the detainee has 
contraband.119 Reasonable suspicion could be provided by the nature 
of the charge, the inmate’s behavior, or the circumstances surrounding 
arrest.120 This standard thus provides at least some—but likely too 
little—protection for the individual privacy interests at stake. 
Third, it is important to keep in mind that most people housed in 
jails have only been convicted of a minor offense, or have not yet 
been convicted of anything. Despite the Court’s holdings that not all 
deprivations within a detention facility technically qualify as 
“punishment,”121 it is doubtful that this distinction provides inmates 
much comfort. 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Florence is faithful to Bell, and its 
analysis is generally sound. But because Bell fails to appreciate the 
severe invasiveness of strip searches, the Supreme Court should 
reconsider this precedent—or at least cabin its influence. 
VII. POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS 
Assuming it reaches the merits,122 it is difficult to predict the 
outcome of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders. In general, the 
Court’s recent record regarding the conditions in detention facilities 
has been mixed,123 and oral arguments did little to clarify how the 
Court is likely to rule.124 Which test the Court will apply is still 
 
 119.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
 120.  It is true that this standard requires discretion, that discretion can be abused, and that 
a standard of reasonable suspicion could be employed in a discriminatory manner. But the 
alternative—that everyone is forced to undergo a strip search—simply extends the abuse to 
everyone. This is a strange sort of equality. 
 121. E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979). 
 122.  It is possible the Court will remand because the question of whether the policies at 
issue violate state law has not yet been fully addressed; see Brief of Former Attorneys General 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–11, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 
10-945 (U.S. filed June 24, 2011). 
 123.  Compare Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006) (upholding a state prison policy 
denying especially dangerous inmates access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs), with 
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (upholding a court order to reduce the population 
of severely overcrowded prisons). 
 124.  See generally Transcript, supra note 94; see also Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: No 
Flat Rule on Strip-searches?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog. 
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unsettled.125 Given this ambiguity, Florence is likely to be a close case. 
A. Applying Bell v. Wolfish to Uphold the Policies 
By a slim margin, the most probable outcome is that the Court 
will apply the Bell balancing test to uphold the blanket strip-search 
policies.126 Such an opinion might look much like the Eleventh 
Circuit’s opinion in Powell127: the Court could emphasize the sheer 
breadth of the policy at issue in Bell128 and that the searches 
conducted in this case are less intrusive than those Bell upheld.129 The 
Court would likely also reiterate the deference owed detention 
officials and the centrality of security concerns in jails and prisons.130 It 
may also suggest that a blanket policy is actually more protective of 
individual dignity than reasonable suspicion because it precludes 
singling out specific inmates for worse treatment.131 In short, such an 
opinion would argue that the balance between security and privacy, 
and the similarity to Bell, require that the policies be upheld. 
B. Applying Bell v. Wolfish to Strike Down the Policies 
A second plausible opinion would apply the Bell balancing test to 
strike down the policies at issue. The holding of such an opinion 
probably would be limited. The Court may state that reasonable 
suspicion is required before conducting strip searches of suspected 
nondrug, nonviolent misdemeanants only, and may differentiate 
between strip searches and mandatory supervised showers.132 It would 
 
com/2011/10/argument-recap-no-flat-rule-on-strip-searches/. 
 125.  Of course, there is a possibility that the Court will conclude that both Bell and Turner 
reach the same result and thus would leave undecided which test is orthodox. See Harmon v. 
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) (describing “the Court’s duty to avoid deciding constitutional 
questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case”). 
 126.  This margin comes from oral arguments. Justice Kennedy is widely considered the key 
swing Justice and has been the deciding vote in some recent criminal cases. See, e.g., Brown v. 
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). During oral arguments, Justice Kennedy indicated his belief that a 
blanket policy is actually more protective of individual dignity than a standard of reasonable 
suspicion, which can be used to single out specific inmates. Transcript, supra note 94, at 6. 
However, there is also some indication that Justice Alito might defy expectations and vote to 
strike down the policies at issue. See Orin Kerr, Thoughts on the Strip-Search Case, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 12, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/thoughts-on-the-
strip-search-case/. 
 127.  Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 128.  Id. at 1303. 
 129.  See id. at 1302.  
 130.  See id. at 1311. 
 131.  This is especially likely if Justice Kennedy writes the majority opinion. See supra note 
126. 
 132.  This seems to be the position Florence’s attorneys ultimately advocated at oral 
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almost certainly emphasize the degrading and potentially traumatic 
nature of strip searches, especially for sensitive populations.133 In turn, 
it would minimize the security concern by noting that arrest for minor 
offenses is usually a surprise134 and that an individual can be arrested 
and taken into custody on even minor charges.135 Furthermore, the 
Court would probably also note that reasonable suspicion is a low 
standard and is easily satisfied.136 
C. Applying Turner v. Safley 
A third plausible, but less likely, outcome would involve the 
Court’s abandonment of the Bell standard in favor of the test in 
Turner.137 In this case, one of two things would probably happen. The 
less likely option is that the Court would itself apply the highly 
deferential Turner standard to uphold the policies by emphasizing the 
rational connection between the policies and a compelling security 
interest.138 The more likely option, however, is that the Court would 
hold that Turner supplies the proper standard and remand to the 
Third Circuit for its application.139 
The outcome of the decision is highly uncertain, but the most 
probable options are that the Court will either apply Bell’s broad 
mandates to uphold the challenged policies, carve out a narrow 
exception, or hold that the standard of Turner has subsumed Bell and 
remand. Though the decision seems likely to be hotly disputed, none 
of the plausible opinions will please ardent civil libertarians or the 
 
arguments. Transcript, supra note 94, at 26–32. 
 133.  See Brief for Psychiatrists, supra note 115, at 14–16 (describing women, children, 
survivors of sexual or domestic abuse, and those with particular religious or cultural beliefs as 
especially likely to suffer serious harm from a strip search). 
 134.  See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 135.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (upholding the arrest of a 
woman for failure to wear a seatbelt, an offense punishable by a fine of up to fifty dollars); see 
also Transcript, supra note 94, at 37, 41–42. 
 136.  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (“While reasonable suspicion is a 
less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than 
preponderance of the evidence, [it] requires at least a minimal level of objective justification. . . . 
[An] officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
hunch of criminal activity.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 137.  It is possible the Court granted certiorari not just to resolve a circuit split, but to make 
clear that Turner had subsumed Bell.  
 138.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“It bears repetition . . . that 
prison security is a compelling state interest . . . .”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) 
(holding that “there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 139.  See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (remanding to the Ninth Circuit to 
apply strict scrutiny, rather than the Turner standard, to a race-based regulation in a prison).  
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defenders of the rights of the accused and the convicted. That battle 
was lost with Bell. 
 
